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The	 management	 and	 economic	 literature	 points	 out	that	 the	most	 valuable	 strategic	 resource	 for	 firms	 in	
the	21st	century	may	no	longer	be	physical	assets	such	as	
land,	 factories	or	machines,	as	was	 the	case	at	 the	begin-
ning	of	 the	20th	 century,	 but	 rather	 intangible	 assets	 such	
as	 knowledge,	 know-how,	 brand-names	 and	 intellectual	
property	rights	(Teece,	2000a	and	2000b).	Moreover,	 in	a	
context	where	technological	progress	has	kept	accelerating,	
successful	companies	in	Hi-tech	industries	tend	to	build	a	
competitive	advantage	on	technological	ground	as	a	way	to	
offer	superior	products.	As	a	result,	the	average	duration	of	
product-life-cycles	has	considerably	reduced.	(Some	claim	
that	this	applies	as	well	to	technology-life-cycles	but	this	is	
still	debated).	In	any	case,	technological	progress	has	rein-
forced	 the	strategic	 importance	of	 technological	expertise	
and	the	ability	of	firms	to	both	develop	and	leverage	their	
technology	 base	 via	 innovative	 activities.	 Companies	 are	
under	pressure	to	learn,	create	and	update	new	technologi-
cal	 competencies,	 while	 unlearning	 obsolete	 knowledge	
and	know	how.
The	 creation	 of	 new	 technological	 know-how	 and	
knowledge	 to	 develop	 new	 products	 and	 processes	 (and/
or	to	improve	existing	ones)	is	supposed	to	give	the	inno-
vating	 company	 a	 competitive	 edge	 on	 the	 market.	 This	
often	 necessitates	 considerable	 investments.	 However,	
technological	 knowledge	 represents	 intangible	 assets	 that	
generally	 show	 the	qualities	of	public	goods:	non-rivalry,	
non-excludability,	non-abrasion	in	use,	and	high	fixed	cost	
in	producing	them.	These	characteristics	may	make	it	dif-
ficult	for	innovating	firms	to	extract	sufficient	returns	from	
these	intangible	assets.	Economic	theory	suggests	that	com-
panies	only	invest	 in	 the	creation	of	new	information	and	
knowledge	if	the	marginal	return	on	additional	knowledge	
generated	 exceeds	 or	 at	 least	 equals	 the	marginal	 cost	 of	
their	 production	 (Magee,	 1977).	Consequently,	 if	 compa-
nies	cannot	effectively	appropriate	enough	returns	on	their	
immaterial	assets,	they	will	be	reluctant	to	invest	the	neces-
sary	resources	for	technological	innovation.	The	problem	of	
extracting	the	returns	of	technological	innovation	is	thus	at	
the	core	of	the	field	known	as	the	management	of	techno-
logical	innovation.
Discussions	 on	 how	 companies	 can	 exclude	 cur-
rent	and	potential	competitors	 from	using	 their	 intangible	
achievements	 in	 the	field	of	 technological	 innovation	has	
résumé
Cet	article	est	consacré	aux	marques	comme	
moyen	 de	 compléter	 les	 brevets	 pour	
extraire	 la	 rente	 attendue	de	 l’innovation.	
Le	cas	longitudinal	de	l’aspirine	de	Bayer	
est	présenté	et	discuté.	Il	apparaît	que	si	les	
start-ups	de	haute	technologie	fondent	leur	
avantage	concurrentiel	 sur	 la	 technologie,	
elles	peuvent	aussi,	dès	l’origine,	constru-
ire	une	marque	au	moindre	coût.	Au	fur	et	
à	mesure	du	cycle	de	vie	de	la	technologie,	
l’importance	 de	 la	marque	 va	 aller	 crois-
sante.	Quand	une	révolution	technologique	
sonnera	 la	fin	de	 cycle,	 la	marque	pourra	
opérer	 comme	 un	 bouclier	 pour	 aider	
l’entreprise	 maintenant	 établie	 à	 survivre	
au	changement.
Mots	 clés	:	Marques,	 Brevets,	 innovation	
technologique,	 interdépendances,	cycle	de	
vie,	protection	de	l’innovation,	aspirine
abstract
This	 paper	 deals	 with	 brand	 equity	 as	 a	
way	to	complement	patents	and	other	tech-
nological	 assets	 in	 technology	 intensive	
industries.	The	longitudinal	case	of	Bayer	
Aspirin	 is	 presented.	The	 discussion	 sug-
gests	 that	 while	 Hi-tech	 start-ups	 build	 a	
competitive	 advantage	 through	 techno-
logy,	 they	 can	 also	 use	 this	 early	 period	
to	build	significant	brand	equity	at	limited	
marketing	costs.	 In	 turn	 this	brand	equity	
may	 become	 increasingly	 important	 as	
the	 technology	 life-cycle	 unfolds.	 When	
the	 next	 technological	 revolution	 strikes,	
brands	may	 serve	 as	 a	 shield	 to	 help	 the	
now	well-established	firms	survive	through	
the	change.
Keywords:	 Brands,	 patents,	 technological	
innovation,	 interdependencies,	 life	 cycle,	
protection	of	innovation,	aspirin
resumen
Este	 artículo	 se	 consagra	 a	 las	 marcas	
como	 medio	 de	 completar	 las	 patentes	
para	 extraer	 los	 ingresos	 esperados	 de	 la	
innovación.	 Se	 presenta	 y	 se	 discute	 el	
caso	 longitudinal	de	 la	aspirina	de	Bayer.	
Si	 los	 start-ups	 de	 alta	 tecnología	 fundan	
su	ventaja	competitiva	sobre	la	tecnología,	
pueden	también,	desde	el	principio,	cons-
truir	una	marca	casi	sin	coste.	A	medida	del	
ciclo	de	vida	de	la	tecnología,	la	importan-
cia	de	la	marca	va	a	ir	creciendo.	Cuando	
una	revolución	tecnológica	sonará	el	final	
del	ciclo,	 la	marca	podrá	operar	como	un	
escudo	 para	 ayudar	 a	 la	 empresa	 (ahora	
establecida)	a	sobrevivir	al	cambio.
Palabras	claves:	marcas,	patentes,	innova-
ción	 tecnológica,	 interdependencias,	 ciclo	
de	vida,	protección	de	la	innovación,	aspi-
rina
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so	 far	predominantly	 focused	on	 legal	 rights	 such	as	pat-
ents.	However,	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 for	 the	protec-
tion	 of	 intangible	 technological	 assets	 show	 considerable	
shortcomings	–	and	particularly	so	for	patents.	Mansfield,	
Schwartz	 et	 al.	 (1981)	 found	 that	 although	 patents	 are	
deemed	to	significantly	increase	imitation	costs,	with	con-
siderable	variations	between	industries,	60%	of	the	patented	
innovations	in	their	sample	had	been	imitated	within	4	years	
after	their	introduction.	Accordingly,	Levin,	Klevorick	et	al.	
(1987)	and	Arundel	&	Kabla	(1998)	have	shown	that	pat-
ent	protection	is	perceived	as	the	least	efficient	protection	
mode	in	the	case	of	process	innovations	(even	though	com-
panies	assume	that	patents	may	increase	imitation	costs	in	
most	industries).	We	feel	that	these	empirical	findings	have	
been	largely	ignored	so	far	in	the	discussion	of	the	appro-
priation	 of	 the	 returns	 of	 technological	 innovation.	More	
precisely,	the	main	influence	of	these	results,	we	argue,	has	
been	to	draw	attention	on	alternative	protection	modes,	e.g.,	
secrecy,	lead-time	advantages	or	company	specific	comple-
mentary	technological	competencies	(Arundel,	2001;	Anton	
and	Yao,	2004;	Leiponen	and	Byma,	2009).	Note	that	this	
meant	keeping	a	primarily	technological	focus	when	look-
ing	at	the	matter.	In	contrast,	market	based	assets,	such	as	
brands,	have	been	neglected	in	this	discussion	on	the	appro-
priation	of	the	returns	of	technological	innovation.	
In	Hi-tech	 industries,	 it	may	 sound	 intuitively	 logical	
to	count	primarily	on	technology	assets	to	protect	techno-
logical	innovation	and	this	is	often	regarded	as	conventional	
wisdom.	The	whole	point	of	our	paper	 is	 to	question	 this	
belief.	In	so	doing,	we	address	what	we	see	as	a	gap	in	the	
literature,	 i.e.	 the	 silence	on	 the	 role	 of	 brands	 and	other	
market-based	assets	 (such	as	 logos	or	control	of	distribu-
tion	channels)	potentially	complementing	patents	and	other	
technology-based	 assets	 to	 protect	 technological	 innova-
tion.	 Even	 in	 Hi-techs	 industries,	 protecting	 innovation	
may	not	just	be	a	story	of	patents,	secrecy	on	technological	
know-how	or	similar	protections	via	 technological	assets.	
Brand	and	other	market-based	assets	may	play	a	role,	and	
we	aim	at	investigating	this	role.	
Brand	 equity1	 is	 increasingly	 recognized	 as	 a	 corpo-
rate	 asset	 of	 utmost	 strategic	 importance.	 Single	 brands	
can	 attain	market	 values	 of	 a	multiple	 of	 the	 companies’	
book	 values	 (Hatch,	 &	 Schultz,	 2001a	 and	 2001b).	Yet,	
research	in	the	field	of	brand	equity	has	primarily	concen-
trated	on	the	analysis	of	the	role	of	brands	for	companies	
active	in	consumer	goods	and	has	largely	neglected	the	role	
of	 brands	 for	 technology	 intensive	firms.	As	 a	 result,	 the	
literature	 remains	 somewhat	 silent	 about	 the	 interactions	
between	 technology-based	 and	market-based	 assets	when	
it	comes	to	securing	the	returns	of	technological	innovation.
We	feel	that	there	is	a	gap	in	the	literature	on	this	matter.	
Our	paper	aims	at	bridging	this	gap.
Our	 core	 proposition	 here	 is	 that,	 in	 high-tech	 indus-
tries,	patents	and	brands	(more	generally	technology-based	
and	market-based	assets)	may	be	viewed	as	a	pair	of	scis-
sors,	one	reinforcing	and/or	substituting	for	the	other	over	
time.	More	 specifically,	we	 adopt	 the	perspective	of	 evo-
lutionary	economics,	with	Dosi‘s	technological	trajectories	
exploring	 technological	 paradigms	 (Dosi,	 1982;	 Durand,	
1992).	We	call	upon	the	concept	of	technology	life-cycle	to	
hypothesize	that	brands	(and	more	generally	market-based	
assets)	may	play	an	increasing	role	over	time	to	complement	
technology-based	protection	against	imitators	as	the	cycle	
unfolds.	Figure	1	captures	our	core	proposition	graphically.
As	 the	 invention	becomes	 a	 technological	 innovation,	
i.e.	when	the	new	technology	is	being	developed	and	imple-
mented,	the	innovators	seeks	to	protect	the	innovation,	pri-
marily	-	if	not	only-	via	technology-based	assets	(patents,	
secrecy	over	manufacturing	processes,	etc.).	At	 that	stage	
brands	and	other	market-based	assets	play	a	minor	role,	if	
any.	The	innovator	reaps	the	rent	from	a	de facto	technol-
ogy-based	early	monopoly	on	the	market.	Then,	as	market	
growth	appears,	imitators	are	keen	to	come	into	the	game	
while	the	innovator	tries	to	bring	in	additional	technologi-
cal	innovations	as	a	way	to	stay	ahead	of	competition.	Yet,	
during	the	early	phase,	the	performance	of	its	unique	tech-
nology	helped	 the	 innovating	firm	build	a	brand-to-be,	 at	
minimal	 cost.	 (The	name	of	 the	 company	was	 frequently	
associated	to	the	technology	concept,	thus	providing	some	
form	of	 a	buzz	 in	 the	 communities	of	 “techies”.	 In	 addi-
tion,	 the	 technologically-advanced	 distribution	 channels	
tended	 to	 promote	 the	 new	 offerings	 as	 a	 way	 to	 differ-
entiate	 from	 more	 classical	 distributors).	 In	 the	 growth	
phase,	this	may	prove	extremely	useful	to	complement	the	
technology-based	assets	to	keep	imitators	away,	or	at	least	
limit	their	market	penetration.	When	the	maturation	phase	
comes,	with	a	variety	of	sub-technologies	serving	specific	
market	segments,	with	dominant	designs	and	dominant	pro-
cesses	now	well	established	and	optimized	(Abernathy	and	
Utterback,	1978,	Abernathy	and	Clark,	1985),	most	of	the	
technology	leaked	to	competitors	and	the	field	is	wide	open	
to	 imitation.	 The	 early	 innovator(s)	 may	 still	 try	 invest-
ing	 in	research	and	 technological	development	but	at	 that	
stage,	the	best	barrier	against	competition	are	likely	to	be	
the	market-based	assets	(brands,	reputation,	control	of	dis-
tribution	channels,	design,	 logo,	etc.).	Along	 the	way,	 the	
patents	 have	 fallen	 into	 the	 public	 domain,	 thus	weaken-
ing	the	technology-based	protection.	Specific	technological	
know-how	may	still	play	a	role,	but	the	marked-based	assets	
took	a	clear	lead2.	Finally,	when	radical	innovations	strikes	
again,	 signalling	 the	 end	 of	 the	 cycle,	 the	 firm	 that	 had	
surfed	the	previous	wave	of	change	is	now	well	established.	
1.	 For	a	detailed	definition	of	the	term	brand	equity	and	its	dimensions	
see	Aaker	(1989;	1991;	1992;	1996).
2.	 Note	that	the	timing	when	this	shift	in	dominance	(technology-based	
vs	market	based	assets)	occurs	is	not	just	attached	to	the	technology	life	
cycle.
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Its	technology-based	assets	are	likely	to	be	rendered	fully	
obsolete	by	the	radical	change.	However,	its	market-based	
assets	may	operate	as	a	shield	to	help	the	company	survive	
through	the	technological	revolution,	stretching	to	keep	its	
customer	 base	while	 running	 behind	 the	 train	 to	 develop	
and/or	acquire	the	new	technology.
This	 hypothetical	 model	 results	 from	 our	 reading	 of	
the	 literature,	combined	with	speculative	 theoretizing	and	
a	preliminary	interpretation	of	a	case	study	on	Cisco	rout-
ers	(Jennewein,	Durand,	Gerybadze;	2007).	We	felt	that	we	
needed	 to	 document	 this	 model	 empirically.	 In	 addition,	
we	hoped	that	another	case	study	would	help	us	gain	some	
insight	 into	 how	 the	 complementarities	 and	mutual	 inter-
dependencies	between	technology-based	and	market-based	
assets	operate	over	time.	This	is	where	we	intend	to	bring	
a	 contribution	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 that	we	 identified	 in	 the	
literature.
Our	 interest	 for	 this	 line	 of	 thinking	was	 in	 fact	 trig-
gered	 by	 examples	 of	 companies	 that	managed	 to	 secure	
strong	market	positions	on	some	technological	innovations	
long	after	the	patents	had	expired,	even	when	the	techno-
logical	 knowledge	had	 spread	over	 to	 competitors.	These	
observations	 were	 puzzling.	 They	 suggested	 that	 some	
other	mechanisms	may	be	at	work,	as	the	traditional	expla-
nation	via	the	technological	assets	could	not	be	regarded	as	
satisfactory.	We	felt	 that	 it	might	be	worth	giving	a	close	
look	at	those	specific	situations	to	gain	some	insight	on	new	
factors	 that	may	explain	part	of	 the	phenomenon.	This	 is	
what	this	paper	is	about.	More	specifically,	we	report	here	
the	results	of	a	longitudinal	study,	the	case	of	Bayer’s	aspi-
rin.	This	case	documents	how	market-based	assets	played	a	
significant	role	in	helping	Bayer	extract	the	rent	attached	to	
the	exploitation	of	the	technological	innovation	–	and	that	
lasted	for	over	a	century,	i.e.	long	after	the	patents	and	the	
technologies	had	fallen	into	the	public	domain.
FIGURE 1
Strategic role of technological assets and brand equity along the technology-life-cycle 
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The diameter of the circles represents the strategic importance of brand equity and technology assets, respectively, over time as the 
life-cycle unfolds.
Source: Jennewein (2005).
2.	 The	concept	of	time	associated	to	the	technology	life	cycle	tends	to	
reflect	the	dynamics	stemming	from	the	adoption	of	a	new	technology	
by	 players	 (both	 producers	 and	 users)	 in	 an	 industry.	 In	 contrast,	 the	
discussion	above,	although	formally	based	on	the	technology	life	cycle,	
suggests	that	the	legal	duration	of	a	patent	may	play	a	major	role	in	the	
business	of	extracting	rent	from	an	innovation:	the	prospect	of	the	end	
of	a	patent	protection	may	in	fact	be	a	significant	driver	here.	And	this	
role	is	likely	to	be	more	significant	than	the	role	of	the	technology	life-
cycle	per se.	We	are	 indebted	 to	one	of	 the	anonymous	 reviewers	 for	
pointing	this	out.	
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Methodology
Our	methodology	stems	from	our	research	objectives.	The	
primary	objective	of	our	contribution	is	to	bring	evidence	
of	the	limitations	of	the	traditional	view	of	the	appropria-
tion	of	technological	innovations	in	Hi-tech	industries	(pro-
tected	ownership	of	technological	assets	being	supposedly	
the	 key	 driver).	 The	 second	 objective	 of	 our	 research	 is	
to	 open	 a	 research	 agenda	 by	 “identifying	 suspects”,	 i.e.	
what	 additional	 independent	 variable(s)	 may	 contribute	
to	 explain	how	 some	firms	 successfully	 secure	 the	 return	
of	 technological	 innovation	 over	 long	 periods	 of	 time.	
The	third	and	final	objective	is	to	start	contributing	to	this	
research	agenda	by	providing	preliminary	insights	on	how	
these	additional	 independent	variable(s)	may	operate,	and	
possibly	interact	with	the	traditional	variables	(technologi-
cal	assets),	to	permit	long	term	appropriation	of	technologi-
cal	innovations	in	Hi-Tech	industries.
This	 set	 of	 three	 objectives	 logically	 led	 us	 to	 a	 case	
study	 approach,	Yin	 (1994).	Although	 this	 paper	 focuses	
on	 a	 single	 case	 study,	 the	 research	 project	 was	 actually	
made	of	two	parallel	independent	case	studies.	The	results	
of	the	two	case	studies	tended	to	reinforce	each	other,	both	
questioning	 the	 traditional	 purely	 technological	 view	 and	
identifying	market-based	 assets	 (typically	 brands	 in	 both	
studies)	 as	 a	 reasonable	candidate	 to	explain	at	 least	part	
of	what	we	observed.	In	addition,	both	studies	led	to	a	pre-
liminary	 model	 of	 interaction	 between	 technology-based	
and	market-based	assets	to	explain	long	term	appropriation	
of	the	return	of	technological	innovation	(Jennewein,	2005;	
Jennewein,	Durand	and	Gerybadze,	2007).
The	case	of	aspirin	was	identified	and	selected	because	
it	is	a	typical	example	of	a	company,	Bayer,	innovating	in	
the	 late	 1890’s	 with	 a	 remarkably	 useful	 new	 drug,	 and	
keeping	market	 leadership	 over	 a	 period	 of	 more	 than	 a	
century.	In	addition,	and	in	 this	sense	this	case	is	unique,	
the	market	leadership	over	a	very	long	period	was	managed	
despite	the	turmoil	and	the	consequences	of	two	world	wars	
that	 saw	Bayer	 lose	 the	 legal	 rights	over	 the	product,	 the	
patents	and	even	the	brand	names,	before	they	managed	to	
regain	control	of	these	rights.
The	 data	 used	 are	 secondary	 data	 that	were	 gathered	
from	 published	 accounts	 of	 the	 history	 of	Bayer	 and	 the	
aspirin	(Alstaedter,	R.	1997;	Bayer	1983	and	1996;	Bohle,	
F.	1988;	Kohl,	F.	1997;	Mann,	C.	C.	and	M.	L.	Plummer,	
1991;	Marseille,	 J.	 1999;	McTavish,	 J.	 R.	 1987;	 Rhône-
Poulenc	1995;	Schreiner,	C.	1999;	Zündorf,	U.	2001).
The	treatment	made	of	the	information	was	interpreta-
tive	in	nature.	We	did	not	start	with	a	conceptual	framework	
that	would	operate	as	a	pair	of	lenses	to	view	the	case	(the	
only	pre-conceived	idea	that	we	brought	in	was	our	suspi-
cion	that	market-based	assets	may	be	playing	a	key	role	in	
the	matter).	Nor	did	we	start	with	a	predefined	theoretical	
model	 to	confront	with	 the	data	stemming	 from	 the	aspi-
rin	 case.	 Instead,	we	wrote	 a	first	 version	of	 the	 story	of	
the	aspirin	at	Bayer	as	a	case	study	 report,	with	no	other	
methodological	concern	 than	 the	 intent	 to	 leave	 room	for	
interpretation	around	the	question	of	candidate	independent	
variable(s)	that	could	explain	how	and	why	Bayer	was	so	
successful	in	extracting	and	securing	rent	from	the	aspirin	
innovation	 for	 such	a	 long	period	of	 time.	Once	we	 real-
ized	from	analyzing	the	case	study	that	market-based	assets	
were	clearly	at	work,	we	returned	to	the	details	of	the	story	
and	identified	where	and	when	brands	and	associated	mar-
ket-based	assets	appeared.	Then,	to	report	our	findings,	we	
chose	 to	complement	 the	 initial	version	of	 the	case	study	
by systematically introducing inserts (in italics) in the text 
of the case study. These inserts aim at discussing the issue 
of both technological assets and market based assets. This 
is done along the way, as the story unfolds.	On	that	basis,	
after	having	confirmed	from	the	case	study	that	technologi-
cal	 assets	 fell	 short	 of	 explaining	 our	 data	 satisfactorily,	
after	having	identified	and	documented	the	important	role	
played	 by	market-based	 assets,	we	finally	 came	 out	with	
an	 interpretative	 table	 that	bring	some	 light	on	how	tech-
nology-	and	market-based	assets	seem	to	be	interacting	in	
sequence	over	long	periods	of	time.	We	start	by	presenting	
the	case	study	and	then	turn	to	summarizing	and	discussing	
our	findings	before	a	conclusion.
The Case of Bayer Aspirin
Bayer	AG	was	established	in	1863	by	Friedrich	Bayer	and	
Johan	Weskott,	 starting	 as	 one	 of	 the	 early	 German	 dye	
companies	which	successfully	extracted	natural	dyes	dur-
ing	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.	Around	1880,	
Bayer	 AG	 experienced	 an	 economic	 downturn	 because	
competitors	were	able	 to	circumnavigate	existing	patents.	
This	was	primarily	due	to	a	peculiarity	of	the	German	pat-
ent	 law	that	made	it	possible	for	 inventors	 to	protect	pro-
duction	processes	but	not	products	themselves.	As	a	result,	
Bayer	chose	 to	diversify	away	 from	 the	dyestuff	 industry	
and	decided	to	expand	into	pharmaceuticals.
•	The	Innovation:	Acetylsalicylic	Acid	(ASA)
Salicylic	 acid,	 initially	 extracted	 from	 the	bark	of	 the	
willow-tree,	had	been	known	since	the	Greeks.	Hippocrates	
recommended	the	use	of	‘Spirea’	(bark)	to	treat	all	kinds	of	
pain	and	fever.	In	1763	Edward	Stone	presented	a	report	to	
the	Royal	Society	in	London	where	he	described	how	the	
extract	of	the	Salix-bark	had	permitted	the	successful	treat-
ment	of	50	patients	suffering	from	fever.	In	1825	the	Italian	
pharmacist	Francesco	Fontana	isolated	the	active	substance	
of	the	bark	for	the	first	time.	He	called	it	“Salicine”	accord-
ing	to	the	Latin	name	of	wild	vine	found	in	willow-thickets.	
In	1853	the	French	chemist	Charles-Frédéric	Gerhard	was	
the	first	to	analyse	the	exact	composition	of	salicylic	acid	
and	to	reproduce	a	crude	form	of	it.	This,	however,	remained	
unexploited	 because	 of	 Gerhard’s	 early	 death.	 Building	
on	Gerhard’s	 work,	 Hermann	Kolbe	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Marburg	was	able	in	1859	to	synthesise	pure	salicylic	acid.	
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Heyden,	 a	 scholar	 of	 Kolbe,	 subsequently	 improved	 the	
production	 process,	 allowing	 for	 large-scale	 production	
at	 considerably	 reduced	 costs.	As	 a	 result,	 salicylic	 acid	
became	commonly	used	for	the	treatment	of	infections	and	
rheumatism.	 The	 product	 however	 tasted	 bad,	 provoked	
nausea,	and	could	cause	the	decomposition	of	the	lining	of	
the	stomach.	This	meant	 that	patients	could	only	 take	 the	
medicine	for	short	periods	of	time	(Bayer,	1983	and	1996;	
Rhône-Poulenc,	1995;	Alstaedter,	1997;	Marseille,	1999).
In	that	context,	Felix	Hoffmann,	a	young	chemist	from	
the	 pharmaceutical	 department	 at	 Bayer,	 was	 asked	 to	
search	 for	 a	 drug	 similar	 to	 salicylic	 acid	but	with	 lesser	
side	 effects.	Hoffmann	 heard	 about	 earlier	work	 by	Karl	
Kraut,	another	German	chemist,	who	had	reported	in	1869	a	
progress	on	Gerhard’s	initial	synthesis	of	a	crystalline	form	
of	acetylate	salicylic	acid	(ASA).	Hoffman	sensed	that	ASA	
could	be	 the	product	he	was	 looking	 for	 to	 substitute	 for	
salicylic	 acid.	However	 the	ASA	 produced	 using	Kraut’s	
chemical	process	was	not	pure	enough	as	it	still	contained	
some	free	salicylic	acid,	thus	causing	the	same	side	effects	
as	before	(Mann	&	Plummer,	1991;	Kohl,	1997;	Alstaedter,	
1997;	Schreiner,	 1999;	Zündorf,	 2001).	Hoffman	had	 the	
intuition	 that	ASA	might	 be	 further	 purified	 to	 avoid	 the	
undesirable	 side	 effects.	 He	 tried	 to	 apply	 to	ASA	 exist-
ing	 methods	 of	 refining	 pharmaceuticals.	 He	 succeeded	
in	 doing	 so	 on	 October	 10,	 1897.	 He	 thus	 subsequently	
described	a	method	of	producing	a	pure	and	durable	form	
of	 acetylsalicylic	 acid	 (ASA).	What	 was	 to	 become	 the	
future	Bayer	aspirin	was	born.	
We see here an initial R&D investment made by Bayer. 
This R&D effort benefitted from earlier work conducted 
elsewhere. In the process, Bayer captured external knowl-
edge and built internal technological assets from a combi-
nation of pre-existing knowledge gathered from the outside 
plus in-house capabilities. This led to a new technological 
development that resulted in a major advancement of tech-
nology. Note that the product (ASA) was not new, nor was 
the process that was essentially borrowed from Kraut and 
existing refining methods.
• No	 patent,	 except	 in	 the	 US,	 but	 manufacturing	
know-how
Bayer	tried	to	file	a	patent	for	the	active	substance	ASA.	
However,	the	lack	of	novelty	was	obvious	as	both	ASA	and	
the	process	had	already	been	known	for	several	years.	As	a	
result,	Bayer	did	not	succeed	in	obtaining	patent	protection,	
except	for	the	USA.	
At	about	the	same	time,	Bayer	chose	to	give	a	specific	
name	to	the	new	product,	just	as	they	had	done	earlier	for	
previous	 drugs	 (e.g.	 Phenacetin	 and	Heroin).	They	 intro-
duced	a	brand-name:	Aspirin.	The	name	represents	a	com-
position	 of	 the	 Latin	 name	 for	 bark	 “Spiraea”	 (from	 the	
Greek	“Speiron”)	and	the	‘A’	standing	for	Acetyl.	In	1899,	
two	 years	 after	 Hoffmann’s	 invention,	 Bayer	 applied	 for	
trademark	protection	for	Aspirin	in	Germany	and	the	US.	
This	was	easily	obtained	due	to	the	name’s	genuine	nature	
and	 this	was	 extended	 internationally	 in	1906	 (Schreiner,	
1999)	3.
This is where the dynamics of the Aspirin story bifur-
cates. Right from the beginning, the technological inno-
vation developed at Bayer was not novel enough to be 
fully protectable by a patent. The conditions in which the 
technological innovation had emerged meant that Bayer 
needed other forms of protection than patents. (This justi-
fies our lengthy description of the context of emergence of 
the innovation). In sharp contrast, the apparently insignifi-
cant move consisting of choosing a brand-name and filing 
a trademark for it turned out to prepare what we are about 
to see, namely decades of rent extraction by Bayer on the 
Aspirin business. 
	 In	 the	 early	 days	 of	 commercialization	 of	 Aspirin,	
Bayer	was	encountering	problems	with	druggists	diluting	
aspirin	into	other	white	powders,	including	flour.	Some	of	
the	druggists	were	even	selling	these	other	white	powders	
as	if	it	were	Aspirin.	Bayer’s	response	was	quick.	In	1900	
the	 company	 launched	Bayer	Aspirin	 in	 tablet-form	 con-
taining	500mg	ASA.	By	doing	so,	druggists	did	not	have	
the	possibility	to	dilute	Aspirin	into	other	powders.	In	addi-
tion,	this	created	a	barrier	to	entry	for	potential	competitors	
tempted	to	imitate	Aspirin	products:	pressing	ASA	powder	
into	tablets	turned	out	to	be	difficult	for	new	comers	(due	
to	 the	 extreme	 instability	 of	 the	molecule	 in	 presence	 of	
humidity).	This	made	Bayer	the	only	company	of	the	time	
knowing	how	to	produce	ASA	in	pure	form,	in	high	quan-
tities	at	a	reasonable	price,	and	to	press	the	drug	in	tablet	
form.	Moreover,	each	tablet	was	stamped	with	the	Bayer-
Cross	 and	 the	 packaging	 clearly	 showed	 both	Bayer	 and	
Aspirin	names.	As	a	result,	end-consumers	of	Aspirin	tab-
lets	started	becoming	familiar	with	the	trademark.	
Several	 serious	 influenza	 epidemics	 in	 Europe	within	
the	early	years	of	the	20th	century	provided	an	unexpected	
boost	 to	 Aspirin.	 Physicians	 all	 over	 Europe	 prescribed	
Aspirin	in	considerable	quantities.	Consequently	large	num-
bers	of	consumers	came	into	contact	with	the	Bayer-Cross	
and	the	brand	name	Aspirin.	Large-scale	public	announce-
ments	in	newspapers	of	how	people	could	effectively	cure	
the	flu	with	the	help	of	a	good	rest,	warmth,	and	‘Aspirin,’	
made	 the	 drug	 and	 its	 merits	 known	 to	 a	 vast	 majority	
of	 Europeans	 and	 North	 Americans	 (Alstaedter,	 1997).	
Bayer	 soon	 introduced	Aspirin	 in	 almost	 every	 region	 of	
the	world.	In	turn,	the	product	effectiveness	contributed	to	
reinforce	brand	awareness.	And	distributors	were	interested	
in	offering	the	product.	As	a	result,	the	Aspirin	brand	rap-
idly	 built	 international	 recognition	 and	Aspirin	 became	 a	
3.	 In	our	discussion,	 the	name	Bayer	Aspirin	 is	used	 to	 represent	all	
Aspirin	brands	of	Bayer	 in	 the	various	national	and	regional	markets,	
e.g.,	Aspirinia,	Bayaspirina,	or	Aspirine	du	Rhône.
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word	used	daily	in	many	households	throughout	the	world	
(Bohle,	 1988).	This	was	 achieved	very	 early	on,	 at	mini-
mum	marketing	and	communication	cost.
The lack of solid patent protection (except for the US) 
did not hurt Bayer in the early days of commercialization of 
Aspirin as the company kept building technological assets 
that served as entry barriers: Bayer developed specific 
manufacturing capabilities essentially protected by secrecy 
on know how (scale and efficiency of production processes; 
ability to press tablets despite ASA instability). Note that 
these efforts to build proprietary process knowledge were 
triggered not by competitors (in Porter’s rivalry sense) but 
instead by distributors that made inadequate use of the 
product. Conversely the existence of a trademark very early 
on made it possible to start building a brand at basically 
no cost, by simply adding the Aspirin name on the tablets 
and benefitting from the press coverage of the epidemics. 
One could argue that the boosting effect of epidemics was 
contingent – and so it was. But the fundamental ingredients 
needed to benefit from the contingency happened to be in 
place. (Sometimes luck is in fact well deserved).
• A	strong	position	until	1914
All	 in	 all,	 Hoffmann’s	 invention	 allowed	 for	 a	 large-
scale	production	of	ASA	and	thus	the	treatment	of	patients	
suffering	 from	 rheumatism,	headaches	or	 even	 inflamma-
tion.	 The	 drug	 was	 very	 effective,	 with	 low	 side	 effects	
compared	 to	 other	 treatments	 available	 at	 that	 time.	This	
superior	product	combined	to	specific	technological	knowl-
edge	 in	ASA’s	production	process	 formed	a	platform	that	
proved	extremely	useful	to	establish	a	brand	and	to	access	
distribution	channels.	
In	the	US,	Bayer	even	enjoyed	a	legal	de facto	monop-
oly	in	manufacturing	and	distributing	any	product	contain-
ing	ASA.	This	actually	led	to	some	controversies.	Bayer’s	
policy	of	marketing	pharmaceuticals	under	protected	names	
was	heavily	disputed	by	medical	associations	because	phy-
sicians	 often	 did	 not	 know	 the	 active	molecule	 and	 thus	
could	not	prescribe	the	drug	under	its	generic	name	but	had	
to	use	its	trade-name.	Consequently,	druggists	were	selling	
the	more	expensive	product	associated	with	the	trademark	
and	could	not	vend	a	cheaper	generic	version	(McTavish,	
1987).		In	this	sense,	the	right	to	launch	new	pharmaceuti-
cals	under	a	registered	genuine	name	represented,	according	
to	the	American	Medical	Association	(AMA),	the	extension	
of	patent	right	protection:
“…it	has	been	impossible	in	this	country	for	anybody	
except	Bayer	to	manufacture	or	sell	acetylsalicylic	acid.	
…	Not	content	with	the	iron-bound	monopoly	which	it	
had	been	granted	through	our	patent	laws,	the	company	
attempted	further	to	clinch	its	exclusive	rights	by	giving	
the	preparation	a	fancy	name,	“Aspirin,”	and	getting	a	
trademark	on	this	name.”	(Mann & Plummer, 1991).
We clearly see here some form of two-way complemen-
tarities that appeared very early on between proprietary 
technologies and brand equity in extracting value from an 
innovation. More specifically, the case suggests three inter-
esting elements. Firstly, the brand name was established in 
a few years time thanks to technological assets: it is tech-
nology, via technological innovation, that made it possible 
to file a trade-mark. Secondly, the brand-name appearing 
on the tablets turned out to support Bayer’s technological 
answer (tablets) against the misuse (dilution) of the product 
by some distributors (druggists). This means that the brand-
name complemented the purely technological protection 
of the product (tablet form and manufacturing process). 
Thirdly, the dynamics of the story shows that the building 
of the Aspirin brand did not cost much to Bayer. Everything 
worked as if filing a trade-mark very early on meant putting 
the brand in a position to piggyback the dynamics of mar-
ket penetration associated to technological assets (product 
superior performance and specific manufacturing capabili-
ties). This also worked to access distribution networks. In 
this sense, the story that unfolds is not a sequence of a tech-
nological innovation followed by the emergence of a global 
brand and the control of distribution channels. Instead, it 
is a story of an innovation combining two facets: a tech-
nological achievement put to the market, and the parallel 
building of distribution channels and the emergence of a 
brand. In addition, the combination works dynamically and 
almost simultaneously: the technology starts and immedi-
ately after the marketing side comes in to both benefit from 
and support the technological advantage.
Facing	the	approaching	date	of	expiration	of	the	patent	
in	the	US	in	1917,	Bayer	focused	its	attention	on	its	trade-
mark	as	the	trade-name	protection	would	continue	to	run.	
(This	was	not	an	issue	elsewhere	as	Bayer	had	been	denied	
a	 patent	 except	 in	 the	 US).	 In	 early	 1914,	 the	 company	
launched	 an	 advertisement	 campaign	 promoting	 its	 prod-
ucts	directly	to	end-consumers,	hoping	to	further	increase	
consumers’	 familiarity	 with	 the	 Bayer	 name,	 reinforce	
their	 awareness	 about	 the	 trademark	Aspirin,	 and	 link	up	
the	two	names4.	This	advertisement	campaign	to	promote	a	
drug	introduced	a	radical	change	in	the	industry	tradition.	
It	enraged	medical	associations	and	physicians	but	further	
increased	 and	 strengthened	 consumers’	 awareness	 about	
Bayer	Aspirin	(Mann	&	Plummer,	1991).
However,	in	august	1914	the	First	World	War	broke	out.	
Bayer’s	global	Aspirin	business	was	going	to	be	completely	
transformed.
We see here a more classical move. When the protection 
via the technological assets is about to expire, companies 
tend to turn to the market-based assets. While the initial 
building of the Aspirin brand name had not required heavy 
communication investments, Bayer was finally deciding 
to start investing in the brand. However, at that stage the 
4.	 All	 the	 advertisements	 contained	 the	 following	 sentence:	 “The	
Trade-Mark	 ‘Aspirin’	 (Reg.	 U.S.	 Pat.	 Off.)	 is	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	
monoacetic	acid	ester	of	salicylic	acid	in	these	tablets	is	of	the	reliable	
Bayer	manufacture.”	McTavish,	J.	R.	(1987),	p.	357.
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brand recognition was already largely established and the 
investments that started in 1914 were essentially needed to 
reinforce and maintain the brand (and thus reinforce the 
distribution channels). Adopting a counterfactual perspec-
tive, one could imagine that building a brand from scratch 
at that point would most certainly have cost much more. 
In any case, the outbreak of WWI did not permit to pursue 
such investments. 
• Bayer	AG	loses	some	of	its	right
On	 December	 12,	 1918,	 just	 a	 few	 weeks	 after	 the	
armistice	 of	 November	 1918,	 the	 APC	 (Alien	 Property	
Custodian	 act)	 auctioned	 Bayer	 Corporation’s	 properties	
in	 the	 US.	 These	 were	 properties	 that	 had	 been	 confis-
cated.	They	not	only	included	the	Rensselaer	plant,	one	of	
America’s	largest	chemical	plants,	but	also	a	collection	of	
patents	and	trademarks,	of	which	the	Bayer	Aspirin	was	the	
most	valuable.	This	desperate	situation	for	Bayer	resulted	
from	a	legal	mistake	made	much	earlier.	Bayer	Corporation	
in	the	USA	had	not	been	using	licenses	for	patent	and	trade-
marks	from	Bayer	AG	in	Germany,	but	 in	fact	owned	the	
legal	rights	on	most	patents	and	trademarks	for	the	North	
and	 South	 American	 markets.	 The	 APC	 sold	 the	 com-
pany	to	the	highest	bidder,	Sterling	Products	Inc.,	a	small	
American	patent	medicine	company,	for	US$	5.31	million.	
Sterling	immediately	sold	the	dyestuffs	part	of	Bayer	Corp.	
Furthermore	it	merged	the	former	pharmaceutical	activities	
of	Bayer	 into	 the	Winthrop	Chemical	Company	 that	 sub-
sequently	 registered	 the	Bayer	 and	 logo	 (Bayer-Cross)	 in	
Latin	America	(McTavish,	1987;	Mann	&	Plummer,	1991;	
Schreiner,	1999).
The	Aspirin	business,	however,	was	kept	 as	a	distinct	
unit.	 In	 July	1920,	Sterling	also	purchased	 the	 trademark	
and	patent	rights	of	Bayer	 in	 the	United	Kingdom.	These	
had	also	been	confiscated	as	a	result	of	the	war.	In	so	doing,	
Sterling	acquired	the	intellectual	property	rights	in	various	
other	countries	that	were	still	under	British	control	at	that	
time.
Sterling	intended	to	sell	ASA	under	the	Bayer	Aspirin	
name	 associated	 with	 the	 Bayer-Cross	 logo	 all	 over	 the	
world	(McTavish,	1987).	However,	the	company	had	seri-
ous	problems	in	producing	the	drugs	which	it	had	acquired.	
The	sophisticated	production	facilities	at	Rensselaer	soon	
appeared	 to	become	a	 form	of	 technological	mirage.	The	
previous	German	supervisors	and	managers	of	the	plant	had	
been	jailed	or	sent	away	so	that	nobody	knew	how	to	run	the	
machines	 or	 operate	 the	 facilities	 efficiently.	 In	 addition,	
Sterling’s	employees	could	not	understand	Bayer’s	patent	
documents.	 These	 were	 supposed	 to	 explain	 Hoffmann’s	
production	process	of	ASA	but	were	perceived	by	chem-
ists	as	a	marvel	“of	obfuscation”	(Mann	&	Plummer,	1991).	
Thus,	Sterling’s	only	possibility	 to	get	 access	 to	 the	pro-
cess	knowledge	and	to	keep	its	Aspirin	business	going	was	
to	ask	the	previous	owner	of	the	facilities	for	help.	Hence	
Sterling	approached	Bayer	AG	at	Leverkusen.	
This tends to suggest a significant difference between 
technology-based and market-based assets when it comes 
to acquisition. While market-based assets may be controlled 
by property rights, the case study confirms that technology-
based assets may be socially embedded in an organization 
and in some of its key people. The real protection offered by 
the technological assets came from the proprietary knowl-
edge of manufacturing processes, not from the ownership 
of the manufacturing facilities, nor from the patent (the US 
patent had already expired by then).
•Swapping	technical	assistance	for	market	access
Bayer	management	in	Germany	realised	that	this	request	
from	Sterling	was	a	good	opportunity	to	regain	some	influ-
ence	on	 the	American	Aspirin	business.	 In	October	1920,	
Bayer	 signed	 an	 agreement	with	Sterling.	The	 agreement	
allowed	Bayer	to	jointly	sell	with	Sterling	all	forms	of	ASA	
based	products	in	Latin	America	for	a	period	of	50	years.	
This	would	be	done	under	the	Aspirin	brand,	also	using	the	
Bayer	name	associated	with	the	Bayer-Cross	logo.	In	addi-
tion,	Sterling	 transferred	back	 to	Bayer	AG	 its	 trademark	
rights	for	Latin	America.	In	return,	Bayer	AG	was	to	bring	
technical	assistance	to	Sterling	in	producing	ASA.	In	other	
words,	 Bayer	AG	 agreed	 to	 swap	 technology	 support	 to	
Sterling	in	the	US	against	a	joint	control	of	the	business	in	
Latin	America.	
However,	on	May	1920,	a	few	months	before	the	‘Latin	
American	Treaty’	was	signed	by	the	two	companies,	Judge	
Learned	Hand	ordered	that	the	‘Aspirin’	trademark	owned	
by	Sterling	in	the	US	was	to	become	a	generic	name,	indic-
ative	of	any	ASA	product	(Mann	&	Plummer,	1991).	As	a	
result,	Sterling’s	Bayer	Aspirin	became	one	among	many	
Aspirin	brands	in	the	US.	
In	 1923	 Bayer	AG	 and	 Sterling	 signed	 another	 con-
tract,	the	so	called	‘Weiss-Treaty’.	This	agreement	divided	
the	world	into	three	regions.	One	zone	where	Sterling	was	
the	single	owner	of	 the	rights	on	the	Bayer	name	and	the	
Bayer-Cross	logo:	these	were	the	USA,	South	Africa,	Great	
Britain,	Australia,	New-Zealand,	and	all	British	territories.	
The	second	region	was	Latin	America,	where	both	compa-
nies	could	use	the	Bayer	name	and	logo.	The	last	and	third	
region	 included	 all	 remaining	 countries,	 i.e.	 continental	
Europe,	African	countries	except	those	under	French	con-
trol	and	Canada:	there,	Leverkusen	had	the	exclusive	rights	
on	the	Bayer	name	and	logo.	In	addition,	Bayer	AG	agreed	
to	give	Sterling	continued	 technical	 assistance	 in	produc-
ing	Aspirin	for	the	US	market	in	return	for	half	of	the	US	
profits.
These episodes illustrate the vulnerability of brands 
when faced to legal decisions in court. They also give an 
indication of the bargaining power attached to intangible 
technological assets (in this case proprietary manufactur-
ing know-how). Bayer AG was leveraging its technological 
know-how, giving away some technological assistance to 
regain market-based assets. This does not suggest that the 
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two types of assets are substitutable. However they clearly 
appear to be swappable. 
• Losing	some	rights	again	-	Battling	to	regain	the	rights	
-	and	competition	increases
In	1941,	when	 the	USA	officially	entered	 the	Second	
World	War,	the	US	ministry	of	justice	declared	the	Sterling-
Bayer	AG	agreements	guilty	of	violating	antitrust	laws.	The	
existing	agreements	were	thus	cancelled.	As	a	result,	Bayer	
AG	once	again	lost	its	rights	on	using	the	Bayer	name	and	
logo,	and	the	trademark	Aspirin	in	most	countries.
Around	 1949,	 Bayer	 AG	 re-launched	 an	 advertising	
campaign	 for	 the	Bayer	Aspirin	 in	 those	 countries	where	
they	had	not	lost	their	rights,	especially	in	Germany.	Bayer	
AG	also	 tried	 to	 regain	ownership	on	 international	 trade-
mark	rights	attached	to	the	Bayer	and	Aspirin	names.	They	
took	 legal	 action,	 appealing	 against	 the	 ruling	 of	 the	US	
ministry	of	justice	from	1941.	However,	Bayer	AG	finally	
lost	its	litigation	in	the	US	in	1962	and	thus	abandoned	any	
hope	to	regain	ownership	on	the	Bayer	and	Aspirin	interna-
tional	trademarks	in	court.
In	 the	 meantime,	 several	 new	 brands	 of	 ASA	 had	
appeared	 on	 the	 US	 market	 (e.g.	 Anacin,	 Bufferin	 or	
Tylenol),	 claiming	 product	 superiority	 over	 Aspirin	 via	
communication.	 (Anacin	 advertisement	 budget	 amounted	
to	some	US$	15	million	in	the	mid	1950s).	In	some	other	
countries,	e.g.,	France	or	the	UK,	new	analgesics	based	on	
acetaminophen	 were	 successfully	 marketed,	 claiming	 no	
gastrointestinal	 bleeding	 and	 no	 upset	 stomachs5.	During	
the	 early	 post	 war	 period,	 the	 response	 of	 Sterling	 and	
Bayer	AG	to	the	arrival	of	new	Aspirin	brands	and	alterna-
tive	drugs	was	only	moderate.	In	fact,	until	1962,	both	com-
panies	were	predominantly	occupied	by	their	legal	battle.	
In	 1970,	 Bayer	AG	 negotiated	 with	 Sterling	 the	 pur-
chase	 of	 the	 international	 rights	 on	 the	 Bayer	 name	 and	
logo,	exclusive	of	the	US	and	Canada,	for	US$	2.8	million.	
In	addition,	in	1978,	Leverkusen	bought	Miles	Laboratories,	
the	maker	of	Alka-Selzer.	During	all	these	years,	Bayer	AG	
kept	 trying	 to	 improve	 the	 product	 via	 some	 incremental	
innovations,	 e.g.	 new	 tablets	 with	 vitamin	 C,	 faster	 pain	
releasing	effect	and	increased	tolerance.	Later	these	efforts	
also	 led	 to	 effervescent	 tablets,	 chewable	 tablets	 or	 the	
twin-packaged	ASA	tablets	for	the	treatment	of	migraine.
This lengthy battle between Sterling and Bayer suggests 
that intellectual property rights can lure players away from 
the heart of competition. It also shows how the focus shifted 
from a technological asset perspective to an issue around 
market-based assets. Proprietary technologies were no 
longer the main concern at this stage. Instead, trademarks, 
logos, a global brand and the control of distribution chan-
nels were the focus of attention. Yet, the company kept work-
ing on improving the technological assets via innovation. In 
other words, it is not “either technology or market based 
assets”. It is both. There was a major focus on brand at that 
point, but technological innovation remained on the agenda 
as a competitive weapon to maintain the brand value.
• ASA	effective	to	prevent	heart	attacks
The	1980s	turned	out	to	be	another	turning	point	for	the	
substance	ASA	in	general	and	the	Bayer	Aspirin	in	particu-
lar.	In	1978	the	New	England	Journal	of	Medicine	published	
Barnett’s	results	about	ASA	significantly	reducing	the	risk	
of	 apoplexy.	 In	 1982	Prof.	Vane	 of	 the	Royal	 Physicians	
College	 in	London	 received	 the	Nobel	Price	of	Medicine	
for	showing	that	ASA	and	thus	Aspirin	inhibits	the	produc-
tion	of	certain	prostaglandin	groups.	Around	the	same	time,	
Bryan	Smith	and	Jim	Willis	discovered	the	effect	of	ASA	
in	preventing	the	agglomeration	of	platelets	which	causes	
thrombosis.	 By	 1983	 the	 results	 of	 the	 so	 called	 Lewis-
Study	suggested	that	ASA	reduced	by	half	the	risk	of	heart	
attack	for	people	with	an	unstable	angina	pectoris.
A	major	confirmatory	study,	known	as	 the	Physicians	
Health	Study,	was	undertaken	in	1988.	It	involved	22,071	
volunteers,	 fifty	 percent	 being	 treated	with	 325	mg	ASA	
tablets	 every	 day,	 the	 other	 with	 a	 placebo.	 The	 results	
showed	that	the	group	taking	ASA	experienced	47%	fewer	
heart	attacks	than	the	group	taking	the	placebo	(Schreiner,	
1999).		The	results	published	in	the	New	England	Journal	
of	Medicine	triggered	an	enormous	response	in	media	and	
gave	 the	ASA	business	an	unexpected	new	 impetus.	This	
obviously	strongly	benefited	to	Bayer	Aspirin.	
It	was	in	the	middle	of	these	promising	developments	
that,	in	1986,	Bayer	AG	paid	US$	25	million	for	the	right	to	
use	the	name	Bayer6
	for	its	American	holding	that	was	sub-
sequently	 renamed	 ‘Bayer	USA	 Inc.’	By	September	1994	
Bayer	AG	in	Leverkusen	had	regained	exclusive	rights	on	
the	Bayer	name	and	the	Bayer-Cross	logo	in	all	countries.	In	
1999	Bayer	AG	celebrated	the	100th	birthday	of	the	registra-
tion	of	the	trademark	Aspirin	at	the	‘Kaiserliche	Patentamt’	
(‘German	Emperor’s	Patent	Office’)	in	Berlin.
We see the successful ending of decades of effort by 
Bayer to regain control of market-based assets (trade-
name, brand, logo and to some extent distribution chan-
nels). But we also see continuous attention being paid to 
maintaining the technology assets and improving the prod-
uct via innovation. And when a good surprise comes, when 
ASA is found to prevent heart attacks -contingency again-, 
the company is ready for it because it stayed on the move, 
keen to leverage its technological asset base.
5.	 The	advertisement	campaigns	were	so	successful	that	the	marketing	
director	 of	Winthrop	 ascertained	 in	 the	 early	 1960s:	 “If	 you	were	 in	
Britain	in	the	fifties	and	asked	for	Aspirin,	it	would	be	‘Good	God	are	
you	trying	to	kill	yourself?’	Aspirin	was	not	only	a	poison,	but	it	would	
burn	a	hole	in	your	stomach!”	Mann,	C.	C.	&	Plummer,	M.	L.	(1991),	
p.	189.
6.	 However	the	trademark	Bayer	Aspirin	was	excluded	from	the	deal	
and	thus	only	Sterling	Products	Inc.	could	sell	Bayer	Aspirin	on	the	US	
market.
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• The	Lipobay	and	anthrax	crises
Business	 life,	 however,	 can	 also	 bring	 bad	 surprises.	
During	 the	 summer	2001,	 one	of	Bayer’s	 pharmaceutical	
products,	Lipobay,	 had	 to	 be	withdrawn	 from	 the	market	
after	losing	market	approval	due	to	concerns	about	undesir-
able	 strong	 side	effects.	This	 severely	damaged	 the	 repu-
tation	of	Bayer	 in	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	and	 it	had	
a	considerable	negative	impact	on	Bayer’s	reputation	as	a	
whole	and	on	the	company	value.	The	Bayer	Lipobay	scan-
dal	 even	 reached	 the	point	where	Bayer	 thought	 of	 com-
pletely	 selling	 its	 pharmaceutical	 division.	 However,	 the	
anthrax	crisis	broke	out	at	about	the	same	time.	Bayer	was	
the	only	pharmaceutical	company	able	 to	readily	offer	an	
effective	 anti-anthrax	 drug:	 the	 Ciprobay.	 This	 saved	 the	
pharmaceutical	division.	
This tends to suggest another significant difference 
between technology-based and market-based assets. The 
Lipobay incident show how vulnerable a brand can be in 
a Hi-tech sector such as the drug industry. In addition, it 
shows how risky it may be to use corporate brands for spe-
cific products when product-related isolated incidents can 
have considerable influence on the general reputation of the 
company. In other words, while showing the importance of 
market-based assets in the second part of the life of a tech-
nological innovation, the case suggests the extreme vulner-
ability of the brand. (After decades of efforts to recapture 
brand control, Bayer came close to abandoning its phar-
maceutical activities!) In contrast one may hypothesize that 
technological assets can be more resilient when facing such 
a crisis. 
• Bayer	Aspirin	market	positions,	a	century	after	launch-
ing	the	product
Along	all	 these	years,	Bayer	proved	to	be	resilient	on	
the	market	despite	 two	wars	and	 the	arrival	of	competing	
products.	 The	 market	 of	 analgesics,	 fever	 and	 infection	
drugs	 has	 considerably	 changed	 since	 the	 early	 days	 of	
Aspirin	in	1899.	New	substances	such	as	ibuprofen	or	acet-
aminophen	have	been	introduced,	showing	specific	advan-
tages	over	ASA.	Meanwhile	the	field	of	indication	of	ASA	
has	been	substantially	enlarged	into	the	field	of	thrombosis,	
in	particular	into	the	prophylaxis	of	second	heart	attacks.	
The	 resulting	 effect	 of	 these	 diverging	 evolutions	 has	
been	 for	ASA	 production	 a	 continuous	 increase	 over	 the	
years	to	an	estimated	40,000	tons	of	ASA	produced	world-
wide	 every	 year.	 This	 corresponds	 to	 some	 80	 billion	 of	
ASA	tablets	(Marseille,	1999).	In	1997	Bayer	Aspirin	sales	
amounted	to	some	US$	550	million.	In	2005,	Bayer	Aspirin	
was	the	company’s	4th
	most	important	pharmaceutical	sales	
with	an	annual	 turnover	of	US$	630	million	and	a	yearly	
revenue	growth	of	4.8%.	In	2007	and	2008,	it	represented	
€ 689	million	 and	€	 719	million	 respectively	 (of	which	
449	stemmed	from	the	traditional	consumer	health	segment	
and	270	from	the	Cardio	segment).	This	represents	a	global	
market	share	of	approximately	10	to	20%,	with	significant	
variations	according	to	countries,	making	Bayer	Aspirin	the	
second	most	important	analgesics	brand	in	the	world	after	
Tylenol.	 (The	main	 sales	 of	Tylenol	 stem	primarily	 from	
the	US	market	that	accounts	for	approximately	35	to	40%	
of	worldwide	 analgesic	 sales).	 In	 a	 few	 countries,	 Bayer	
was	able	to	uphold	its	dominant	position	over	the	last	100	
years	 even	 though	 patent	 protection	 was	 never	 in	 place,	
while	production	processes	were	broadly	known	and	could	
be	readily	imitated.	
We could find a variety of reasons to explain the resil-
ience of Bayer on the Aspirin market. For example, one 
could argue that being the innovator, Bayer benefited from 
initial dominant market shares that led to substantial learn-
ing curve effects which subsequently reduced production 
cost, improved product quality, and permitted new incre-
mental innovation. But could that explain market lead-
ership a century later? Instead, the core argument that 
emerges from our reading of the case is the complemntary 
role played by both the technology-based and the market-
based assets. 
• Perception	of	innovation	according	to	markets
The	 footprint	 of	 the	 bumpy	 history	 of	 Bayer	Aspirin	
remains	 apparent	 today,	 that	 is	 several	 decades	 later.	 In	
those	countries	where	Bayer	Aspirin	has	been	permanently	
present	over	the	entire	100	year	period	and/or	where	Bayer	
more	or	 less	continuously	held	 its	exclusive	rights	on	 the	
trademark	Aspirin,	 e.g.,	 Germany,	 Spain,	 Italy,	 and	most	
of	 Latin	 America,	 the	 company	 still	 occupies	 a	 leading	
position	in	the	analgesic	market.	In	Germany,	for	instance,	
Bayer	Aspirin	still	had	a	40%	market	share	of	ASA	in	1996	
(although	 the	price	for	standard	Bayer	Aspirin	was	300%	
more	than	the	cheapest	product	on	the	market7).	In	addition,	
with	such	a	price	premium,	Bayer	enjoys	significant	profits	
and	can	give	distributors	in	those	markets	significant	higher	
margins	than	what	cheaper	competing	products	could	pro-
vide.	On	the	other	hand,	in	those	countries	such	as	the	US	
where	the	trademark	Aspirin	was	made	a	generic	name	and	
where	 the	 legal	 quarrels	 between	 Sterling	 and	Bayer	AG	
prevented	proper	brand	management,	Bayer’s	position	on	
Aspirin	products	 is	considerably	weaker.	Finally,	 in	 those	
national	 markets	 such	 as	 France	 and	 its	 former	 colonies	
where	the	Bayer	Aspirin	brand	was	not	present	at	all	over	a	
period	of	several	years,	consumers	have	become	acquainted	
with	 local	Aspirin	 brands.	 There,	 Bayer	 did	 not	 re-enter	
because	of	the	lack	of	strategic	advantage	vis-à-vis	estab-
lished	national	competitors.	The	knowledge	to	produce	pure	
ASA	in	large	quantities	was	no	longer	proprietary,	and	in	
the	absence	of	specific	marketing	and	commercial	assets	on	
those	markets,	Bayer	AG	had	no	specific	advantage	readily	
perceivable	by	consumers.	
7.	 A	Bayer	Aspirin	500	tablet	was	typically	sold	at	a	price	of	€0.17	per	
tablet	compared	to	€0.04	per	tablet	for	ASS-Ratiopharm	500.
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In	this	context,	an	interesting	feature	of	the	Aspirin	case	
study	 emerges.	 Today	 the	 aspirin	 sold	 by	 Bayer	 has	 the	
same	basic	characteristics	over	all	markets.	The	continuous	
effort	put	by	Bayer	on	technological	innovations	to	improve	
the	Aspirin	product	were	introduced	in	most	markets	in	the	
same	way	(e.g.	reducing	side	effects,	increasing	effective-
ness	 for	 specific	 treatments,	 facilitating	 dosage	 and	 use,	
or	more	recently	addressing	 the	new	indications	for	heart	
attack	prevention).	Yet,	 the	 image	 that	 consumers	 tend	 to	
associate	with	the	product	and	the	brand	vary	significantly	
according	to	the	historical	market	zones.	In	those	markets	
where	Sterling	sold	Bayer	Aspirin	until	the	last	quarter	of	
the	20th	century,	i.e.,	the	USA	and	the	UK,	the	Bayer	Aspirin	
brand	is	perceived	as	familiar	and	homy,	and	the	product	is	
seen	as	a	well	proven	but	rather	outdated	analgesic.	Instead,	
acetaminophen	 and	 ibuprofen	 are	 viewed	 as	 more	 effec-
tive	and	up-to-date.	In	contrast,	on	those	markets	that	have	
been	permanently	served	by	Leverkusen,	the	Bayer	Aspirin	
brand	has	the	image	of	being	a	familiar,	well	proven,	effec-
tive,	 and	 innovative	 pharmaceutical.	 Again,	 the	 various	
Aspirin	product	sold	by	Bayer	AG	on	both	zones	are	basi-
cally	the	same.	
We argue that the bumpy history of the Bayer Aspirin 
provide us with a peculiar lab-like experiment, where sev-
eral markets happened to be addressed (or covered) dif-
ferently over the years due to the 20th century wars. Now 
that these markets are all addressable in the same way, 
with basically the same product range, we can observe the 
consequences of the differences in market-based assets. 
More specifically, our reading of the case study suggests 
that differences in marketing, brand management and cus-
tomer relations can yield significant differences in the con-
sumers’ perception of technological innovations around 
the product. (In turn this leads to significant differences 
in market performance). This is another indication of the 
intricate complementarities and mutual interdependencies 
that bound together market-related and technology-related 
assets.
Recapitulating and discussing the key findings
Let	us	recapitulate	our	key	findings.	We	saw	a	typical	tech-
nological	 innovation	 (ASA)	 that	 called	 upon	 knowledge	
gathered	from	the	outside	combined	with	internal	develop-
ment	capabilities.	We	saw	how	Bayer	almost	immediately	
filed	 a	 trademark	 ‘Aspirin’,	 while	 building	 specific	 tech-
nological	 knowledge	 about	 how	 to	 produce	 pure	 acetyl-
salicylic	acid	in	large	quantities,	at	reasonable	costs	and	in	
tablet	forms.	Patents	were	not	granted,	except	for	the	US,	
but	manufacturing	processes	created	initial	protective	barri-
ers	to	entry.	The	brand	started	building	up	very	early	on,	at	
minimum	cost,	thanks	to	the	superior	technology	(product	
effectiveness,	ability	to	press	tablets).	We	then	saw	that	the	
turmoil	of	the	20th	century	resulted	in	Bayer	losing	some	
of	 its	markets,	 before	 finally	 regaining	 full	 control	 of	 its	
brand	and	market	access.	We	also	saw	that	during	all	these	
years	 Bayer	AG	 kept	 working	 on	 improving	 its	 technol-
ogy,	relentlessly	innovating	on	the	product,	even	incremen-
tally.	And	we	saw	that	the	various	markets	regions	did	not	
respond	to	the	same	product	innovations	in	the	same	way.
All	of	this	clearly	indicates	the	role	played	by	the	mar-
ket-related	assets	(the	Bayer	brand,	the	Aspirin	trade-name,	
the	Bayer	Cross	 logo,	 as	well	 as	 the	 relationships	 to	 the	
distribution	channels)	in	helping	Bayer	AG	remain	today	in	
a	position	to	extract	rent	from	a	century	old	technological	
innovation.	This	means	that	the	literature	is	faulty	when	it	
basically	ignores	the	role	of	brand	equity	in	the	appropria-
tion	of	the	return	of	technological	innovation.
The	 study	 also	 suggests	 strong	 interdependencies	
between	 technology-based	 and	 market-based	 assets.	 In	 a	
way,	the	case	shows	how	the	brand	played	a	role	all	along	
the	technology	life-cycle.	Initially,	an	important	source	of	
brand	equity	stemmed	from	the	company’s	superior	 tech-
nological	knowledge	which	 translated	 into	 superior	prod-
uct	 offerings	 and	more	 efficient	 production	 processes.	 In	
that	first	phase,	Bayer	AG	was	in	a	position	to	rapidly	build	
strong	brand	equity	around	 its	 trademark	‘Aspirin’	due	 to	
the	 unique	 advantages	 of	 its	 ASA	 product	 compared	 to	
competing	 substances.	 Although	 Bayer	 did	 not	 initially	
advertise	 its	 drug	 directly	 to	 the	 public,	 the	 trademark	
quickly	achieved	significant	notoriety	among	patients	and	
the	medical	community.	In	a	second	phase,	the	brand-name	
and	 the	 logo	 could	 combine	with	 the	 tablet	 form	 to	 pro-
tect	 Bayer	 against	misbehaviour	 by	 some	 druggists,	 thus	
showing	 typical	 complementarities	 between	 the	 two	 cat-
egories	of	assets.	This	combination,	technology	plus	brand,	
turned	out	to	be	extremely	well	fit	to	make	the	best	out	of	
the	subsequent	epidemics.	Not	only	did	it	lead	to	sell	more	
in	the	short	term,	thus	curing	thousands	of	patients,	but	it	
also	helped	establish	the	brand	name	more	widely	and	for	
decades	 ahead,	 simply	 by	 surfing	 the	wave	 generated	 by	
the	press	coverage	of	the	influenza.	At	that	stage,	technol-
ogy	was	 still	 the	key	 asset,	 and	 the	brand	 and	 logo	were	
essentially	piggybacking	on	technology	to	reach	visibility.	
This	in	turn	led	to	a	third	phase	where	the	combination	of	
the	two	categories	of	assets,	namely	the	US	patent	and	the	
brand-name,	was	seen	by	the	American	medical	association	
as	a	remarkably	locked	monopolistic	setting.	By	then,	we	
suggest,	the	two	categories	of	assets	were	on	par	in	terms	of	
relative	importance.	Yet,	as	the	patent	was	expected	to	fall	
soon,	the	market-based	assets	were	to	take	the	lead	-	thus	
the	1914	 launch	of	an	advertising	campaign	 in	 the	US	 to	
consolidate	the	brand.	
The	 sequence	 that	 we	 summarized	 so	 far	 suggests	 a	
typical	linear	dynamics	in	the	complementarities	over	time	
between	technology-based	and	market-based	assets	in	their	
relative	 role	 to	 protect	 a	 rent.	 First	 Technology.	 Second,	
Technology	and	brand.	Third,	this	technology	and	brand	on	
equal	footage,	and	soon	after	technology	and	Brand.	Fourth	
the	Brand	only,	when	 radical	 innovation	 strikes,	meaning	
that	 the	 technology-based	 assets	 would	 have	 to	 be	 fully	
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renewed.	This	corresponds	to	the	phases	of	our	hypothetical	
model	shown	on	Figure	1.	(Note	that	the	Aspirin	story	does	
not	fully	document	the	last	phase,	as	radical	technological	
change	did	not	occur	yet	to	start	a	new	cycle).	Table	1	pres-
ents	 a	 summary	of	 the	events	 and	 features	of	 the	Aspirin	
case.
Due	to	the	wars,	as	we	have	seen,	the	Bayer	case	study	
did	 not	 exactly	 unfold	 in	 a	 linear	 way.	 Instead,	 we	 saw	
Bayer	AG	losing	its	rights	on	some	markets,	then	battling	
over	decades	to	regain	them,	including	by	swapping	some	
of	the	lost	market-based	assets	against	technical	assistance	
in	manufacturing.	This	suggests	that	the	two	categories	of	
assets,	if	not	fully	substitutable	at	any	point	in	time,	appear	
to	be	swappable,	at	least	to	some	extent.	We	also	saw	how	
their	IPR	battle	did	lure	both	Bayer	AG	and	Sterling	away	
from	reacting	to	the	competition	of	new	entrants.	This	sug-
gests	that	IPR	issues,	as	important	as	they	can	be,	should	not	
be	overplayed.	We	further	saw	that	while	battling	to	regain	
market-based	assets	on	the	external	front,	Bayer	AG	chose	
to	keep	 investing	 in	 technology	development	and	 innova-
tive	activities.	We	argue	that	this	continuous	attention	paid	
to	 technology	 subsequently	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 helping	
Bayer	capture	the	benefits	of	the	discovery	of	ASA’s	effects	
on	heart	 diseases	 (Cardio	 representing	 today	 almost	 40%	
of	Aspirin	 sales	at	Bayer).	This	 suggests	 that	 the	 relation	
between	 technology-based	and	market-based	assets	 is	not	
an	“either-or”,	nor	a	“first	technology,	then	brand”.	Instead,	
it	 looks	 more	 like	 a	 mutually	 interdependent	 couple,	 of	
which	the	centre	of	gravity	shifts	over	time.
With	the	Lipobay	/	Ciprobay	crises,	we	saw	how	vulner-
able	a	brand	can	be	to	market	incidents,	as	much	as	we	had	
seen	how	technology	know-how	can	be	embedded	 in	key	
HR,	as	Sterling	had	learnt.	This	suggests	that	market-based	
and	technology-based	assets	are	both	vulnerable,	although	
not	in	the	same	way.	(Conversely	we	may	hypothesize	that	
in	case	of	market	crisis,	the	technology	may	stand	firm;	and	
so	may	the	brand	when	key	staff	leave).	The	above	episodes	
also	suggest	that	real	control	of	the	technology	and	positive	
recognition	of	the	brand	are	more	important	than	property	
rights	per se.	
We	also	saw	an	intriguing	phenomenon:	how	consum-
ers	 from	 various	market	 zones	 today	 perceive	 differently	
the	 same	 products,	 incorporating	 the	 same	 technological	
innovations.	We	saw	that	the	differences	in	this	perception	
of	advanced	technological	offerings	essentially	stem	from	
TABLE 1
Key Events and Features of the Aspirin Case study
Period …-1897 1897-1914 1918-1941
1941-1980
1970-2010
Phase on Fig.1 Invention Innovation Growth Maturity
Techno-based assets R&D	capability -	US	patent	only	
-	Manuf.	Process
-	Tablets
Continuous	techno	
innovation
Continuous	techno	
innovation
Market-based assets none -	Aspirin	name	
filed,	logo	
on	tablets,	
distr.	channels	
penetration
-	Brandname,	logo,	
distrib	channels.
-	But	loss	of	control	
before	recovery
-	Brandname,	logo,	
distrib.	channels
-	Price	thus	margin	for	
distributors
Complementarities  
& interdependenc.
M-based	assets	
piggyback	on	
T-based	assets.
Start	ads	when	US	
patent	to	fall
Swapping	Techn.	
assistance	for	market	
control
Perception	of	techn.	
innovation	vary	according	
to	markets
Competition Druggists	dilute	in	
white	powder
Bayer	vs	Sterling	
Anicin,	Tylenol,...
-	Generic,	Low	cost	
-	Local	brands
Other Move	away	
from	dye
Influenza
Impact	of	two	wars
-	Cardio	market
-	Crises
Relative role of T-  
vs M-based assets  
to protect innovat.
Technology Techno-market
techno-market
then
Market-techno
Market
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the	 history	 of	 the	 relation	 that	 the	Bayer	 brand	 had	with	
these	market	zones.	This	suggests	how	intricate	the	mutual	
interdpendencies	 between	 market-based	 and	 technology-
based	 assets	 may	 be,	 thus	 hinting	 for	 interesting	 future	
themes	for	research.
All	in	all,	we	argue	that	the	core	part	of	our	findings	sug-
gests	a	set	of	dual	complementarities	and	interdependencies	
between	technology-based	and	market-based	assets.	These	
complementarities	 run	 throughout	 the	 whole	 technology	
life-cycle	to	protect	the	rent	extraction.	In	addition,	a	shift	
in	 the	 centre	 of	 gravity	 (between	 technology-based	 and	
market-based	assets)	 slowly	 takes	place	over	 time,	 as	 the	
cycle	unfolds.	Also	note	that	the	timing	of	the	patent	end-
ing	may	operate	as	a	key	driver	in	the	process.	Additional	
elements	also	stem	from	the	analysis:	“swappability”	more	
than	 substitutability,	 differences	 in	 vulnerability,	 intricate	
interdependencies	as	the	perception	of	the	same	technologi-
cal	innovations	may	vary	according	to	reputation	on	various	
markets.
These	results	are	derived	here	from	a	single	case	study.	
Furthermore,	a	longitudinal	study	that	spans	over	a	century	
essentially	relies	on	historical	accounts	and	secondary	data.	
Although	internal	validity	was	tested	by	submitting	the	case	
study	for	review	at	Bayer,	one	may	argue	that	the	detailed	
history	of	 the	Bayer	Aspirin	may	 fall	outside	 the	compe-
tence	of	most	Bayer	managers,	except	for	company	urban	
myths	 typically	 conveyed	 by	 public	 relations.	 External	
validity	 cannot	 be	 covered,	 nor	 claimed,	 in	 a	 single	 case	
study.	What	 the	 results	 presented	 here	 have	 to	 offer	 is	 a	
plea	to	open	up	a	research	path	to	dig	more	into	the	role	of	
market-based	assets	in	protecting	the	rent	attached	to	tech-
nological	innovation.	In	other	words,	this	contribution	pri-
marily	opens	a	research	agenda.	The	model	proposed	and	
in	part	documented	here	is	essentially	an	attempt	to	capture	
a	preliminary	macroscopic	view	of	the	issue	that	we	chose	
to	 focus	 upon.	By	 construction,	 it	 cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	
anything	more	than	a	proposal	at	this	stage.	
This	 analysis	 suggests	 potential	 managerial	 implica-
tions.	One,	it	may	be	wise	for	Hi-tech	start-ups	to	consider	
planting	 the	 seeds	 for	market-based	 assets	 very	 early	 on	
(brand-names,	 logo,	 etc.).	This	may	 not	 be	 their	 priority.	
Yet,	they	may	find	it	an	efficient	way	to	build	market-based	
assets	 at	 minimal	 cost.	 Second,	 at	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	
spectrum,	when	 radical	 innovation	 strikes	 to	 sweep	most	
technology	 assets	 away,	 one	 may	 use	 the	 market	 assets	
as	 a	 shield	 that	may	help	bridge	 the	gap	 to	 reach	out	 for	
the	 new	 technological	 trajectory.	 Third,	 in	 between	 the	
start	and	the	end	of	the	technology	cycle	-	even	after	most	
technology-based	 protection	 has	 disappeared-	 it	 may	 be	
a	good	idea	to	keep	investing	in	technology	to	strengthen	
the	brand	and	other	market-based	assets	via	technological	
innovation	along	the	way.	Fourth,	it	may	be	worth	keeping	
in	mind	the	vulnerability	of	a	brand,	thus	thinking	it	twice	
before	tagging	a	Group	global	brand	on	a	technologically	
advanced	offering	that	may	carry	significant	risks.	Fifth,	it	
may	also	be	worth	reminding	practitioners,	if	need	be,	that	
technology	is	partly	tacit	and	thus	partially	embedded	in	the	
social,	 i.e.	 in	people	who	are	highly	mobile.	Sixth,	above	
all,	 it	may	be	worth	checking	whether,	as	is	 too	often	the	
case,	the	organizational	arrangements	in	the	company	have	
split	management	of	market-based	assets	(usually	assigned	
to	marketing)	away	from	the	management	of	 technology-
based	assets	(usually	assigned	to	a	patent	person	in	R&D	
or	 in	 the	 legal	 department	 and/or	 a	 technical	 director	 in	
Operations).	Our	analysis	of	the	Bayer	case	advocates	for	
better	organizational	 linkages	between	these	two	strategic	
protections	of	the	rent	attached	to	technological	innovation.	
Conclusion
Our	aim	 in	 this	paper	was	 to	understand	how	some	com-
panies	manage	to	keep	extracting	rents	from	technological	
innovation	 long	 after	 the	 technology	 (patents,	 manufac-
turing	 know-how)	 has	 fallen	 into	 the	 public	 domain.	We	
suspected	 that	 market-based	 assets	 could	 play	 a	 role	 in	
complementing	 the	 technology-based	 assets.	 We	 aimed	
at	finding	empirical	 indications	of	 this	 role.	 (In	doing	so,	
we	 aimed	 at	 bridging	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 literature	 where	 both	
patents	 and	brands	 are	dealt	with	 in	depth,	 but	mostly	 in	
silos	 as	 if	 they	were	 fully	 independent	modes	 of	 protec-
tion).	Furthermore,	we	aimed	at	gaining	some	preliminary	
insights	 into	 how	 the	 two	 categories	 of	 assets	 interacted	
over	time	to	protect	innovation.
Our	reading	of	the	Bayer	Aspirin	case	shows	that	mar-
ket-based	assets,	including	brand	equity,	can	be	of	utmost	
strategic	importance	in	the	appropriation	of	the	returns	of	
R&D	 investments.	 The	 brand	 equity	 established	 around	
the	product	name	Aspirin	enabled	Bayer	AG	 to	dominate	
the	 analgesic	 market	 over	 an	 impressive	 period	 of	 more	
than	100	years.	Furthermore,	 the	discussion	suggests	 that	
brand	 equity	 is	most	 easily	 built	 by	 the	 innovator,	 as	 the	
market-based	assets	piggyback	the	initial	advantage	stem-
ming	 from	 technology-based	 assets.	 Our	 reading	 of	 the	
case	helps	bring	some	insight	into	the	dynamic	interaction	
between	technology-based	and	market-based	assets	as	the	
technology	unfolds	along	the	technology	life-cycle.
Our	contribution,	based	on	a	single	case	study,	opens	a	
research	agenda	by	claiming	that	it	may	be	worth	investi-
gating	further	into	the	complementary	interdependent	role	
played	by	technology-related	and	market-related	assets	 in	
the	appropriation	of	the	return	of	technological	innovation.	
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